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W j ) change their apartments (homes). And we suppsose, that changes may happen only by the means of the exchange of the apartments, i.e.
x ij (t) ≡ W j , i, j = 1, . . . , n.
(
Suppose, that at the time t ≥ 0 resident r lives in the district k and works in the district m, and the resident l lives in the district p and works in the district q. Then p L k,m; p,q (t) ∆t + o (∆t) -is the probability for the residents with numbers r and l (1 ≤ r < l ≤ N ) to exchange their apartments in a period of time (t, t + ∆t). It's natural to consider that probability (in the unit time) of exchanging apartments depends only on the location of the workplaces and homes, which are exchanged. For instance, it may be considered that the "distance" between district i and district j is c ij ≥ 0, and
sum of the distances before exchange
sum of the distances after exchange
Then, by the virtue of the ergodic theorem for discrete homogeneous Markov process with finite number of states, for all
where Z is the normalizing multiplier.
Here we have the case where the final distribution, which is also a stationary distribution, satisfies detailed balance condition:
on a set (1) is concentrated with N 1 (see below) in a neighborhood of the most probable value
, which is determined as a solution of the following entropic -linear programming problem:
Solution of this problem might be presented as
where Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) λ
and λ W j n j=1
are determined 3 from the system of equations (1) . In practice we usually have some information about {L i , W i } n i=1 and {c ij } n, n i=1,j=1 . So, when we solve (2), we find
Indeed, let us note, that
2 Multipliers before probabilities, for example, in the state {x ij } n, n i=1, j=1 , arise because of the number of the ways to choose the resident, living in the district p and working in the district m, is xpm, and independently the number of ways to choose the resident, living in the district k and working in the district q, is x kq .
3 This can be done in a different ways. For example, by Bregman's balancing method or by Newton's method [5] . The other way is to solve the dual problem for the entropy programming problem (2) . There are a lot of different algorithms with the first order oracle (MART, GISM, etc. [4] , [5] ). It can be shown that most of this methods (including Bregman's) are just barrier-multiplicative antigradient descending methods [11] . At the end (when the iteration process is achieving a sufficient small vicinity of the global minimum) it is worth to use the second order interior-point method, like Nesterov-Nemirovskii polynomial algorithm [12] (for so-called "separable" tasks).
we have "inequality of measure concentration":
2 Beckmann traffic flow distribution model 4 Let us consider the oriented graph Γ = (V, E), which stands for transportation route in some town (V -nodes (vertices), E ⊂ V × V -arc of the network (edges)). Let W = {w = (i, j) : i, j ∈ V } be a set of pairs inlet-outlet;
. . , m − 1 (it will be shown later (see example by V.I. Shvetsov) that, to specify the path it may not be enough to indicate only the set of vertices. In general, one must also specify exactly which edge, connecting the specified vertices, is chosen); P wset of routes in correspondence w ∈ W ; P = w∈W P w -collection of all routes in the network Γ; x p -flux on the way p, x = {x p : p ∈ P }; G p ( x) -specific costs of travel on the road p, G ( x) = {G p ( x) : p ∈ P }; y e -flux on the arc e: y = Θ x, where Θ = {δ ep } e∈E,p∈P (δ ep = {1, e ∈ p; 0, e / ∈ p}); τ e (y e ) -specific costs of travel on the arc e (generally increasing, convex, smooth functions), it is natural to assume, that G ( x) = Θ T τ ( y). Let flows on correspondences d w , w ∈ W to be known. Then x, which describes flow distribution, must lie in the set:
Consider a game in which each element w ∈ W corresponds to a considerably big (d w 1) set of players of the same type. The set of pure strategies of such player is P w , and profit (minus losses) is defined by the formula −G p ( x) (a player chooses a strategy p ∈ P w and neglects the fact, that |P w | components of the vector x and hence the profit depends slightly on his choice). One can show, that Nash equilibrium is equivalent to complementarity problem, which equivalent to a solution of variation inequality, which, in its turn equivalent to a solution of convex optimization problem.
It is easy to show, that in the case G ( x) being strictly monotonic transformation, the Nash-Vardrop equilibrium x * is unique. If τ e (y e ) are increasing functions then y * = Θ x * is unique, although, as we will see later, x * isn't necessarily unique.
The route at a step (n + 1) player at correspondence w, choose independently according the mixed strategy with probability
to choose path p ∈ P w (0 < γ n ≤ 1), and with probability 1 − γ n to choose the same strategy as at the n-th step. Here x p (n) -number of players at w, who have chosen at the n-th step strategy p ∈ P w , and Z w n can be found from the normalization condition. Multiplier max x p (n) , n −1 describes the will to imitate and, also, the reliability of using this strategy. This multiplier notices specifics of the problem (without it there could be convergence to something different from the Nash-Wardrop equilibrium). Parameter γ describes "the conservatism", while "the temperature" T stands for "the risk appetite". Theorem 1 Let T > 0 be sufficiently small,
, where x * is the minimizer from (3). Moreover, if the equilibrium is unique, then x (n)
In the experiments, conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics in the Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control, MIPT, in which students of the 5 th course were involved, we observed the convergence to equilibrium and "vibrations" around it. Fluctuations should be explained, apparently, by the fact that in experiments the number of players was small and the hypothesis of a competitive market was not performed. We also observed, that for students γ n ≡ γ > 0 it is more likely, than γ n ∼ 1/n. As a result there will be convergence not to the equilibrium point, but to its neighborhood. Size of the neighborhood depends on T , γ > 0 and the number of players.
Example 1 (Braess paradox, 1968 [15] ) Let correspondence x 14 = 6 thousand cars/hour (see graphs on Figures 1 and 2) . Weight of the edges is time The following example shows, that under the very natural conditions vectorfunction of cost of the travel G ( x) can't be strictly monotone:
This, for example, can be because of
where y = {y e } e∈E describes the loading of edges (arcs) of a graph of the transport network, τ ( y) = {τ e (y e )} e∈E -vector-function of cost of the travel on the edges of transport network, Θ -incidence matrix of edges and paths, and different vectors of flow distributions x may correspond to the same vector y = Θ x. Theorem 2 Let T > 0 be sufficiently small,
) . Note most of the elements of x * ( x (0)) can be equal to zero.
We should notice, that Theorem 2 is a refutation (in case of the considered dynamics) of the hypothesis [16] . It states that in the case of non-unique NashWardrop equilibrium, the equilibrium is more likely to realize, and it is a solution of the following linear-enthropy programming problem w∈W p∈Pw
where y * -is the unique solution of
3 Sketch of the proof of the Theorem 1
Lemma 1 Let f (w) = −T ln w, where w ∈ (0, 1). α i > 0 -are some randomly chosen, but fixed parameters; w i ∈ (0, 1). Let us consider functions
Then F 0 ( w) ≤ F 1 ( w), and the equality is attained only when
Proof.
The proof is based on the consequent usage of the inequality between harmonic mean and geometric mean and then Cauchy inequality.
Lemma 2 For any x (n) ∈ X : x (n) = x * holds the following inequality
Proof.
Without restricting the generality, we can assume that
From Lemma 1 it follows that
And the equality can be attained only on the equilibrium vector x * , which can not be under considered hypothesis.
Remark 1 Lemma 2 can be more specified. At some neighborhood of the equilibrium there exists l > 0, such that
Also, with some reserves, we can change constraint x (n) ∈ X to x (n) ≥ 0.
and if the equilibrium is unique, then also
Proof. Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 from chapter 2.2 of [25] allow us to consider only the situation, when x (n) is close to x * . Then by Taylor formula we have:
If we take mathematical expectations from both sides of this equality, we will get that there exists sufficiently large C > 0, such that E (Ψ ( x (n + 1))) − Ψ ( x * ) ≤ (1 − lγ n ) · (E (Ψ ( x (n))) − Ψ ( x * )) + C · (γ n ) 2 .
From more general statement from [25] we get that
From Kolmogorov inequality follows
Which concludes the proof. In the end we will formulate a known result, which is in high correlation with the proved one. 
